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1 Introduction
Global agencies working for children affected by
AIDS have recently reported some progress
(UNAIDS 2008). Year by year, more HIV-positive
pregnant women receive medication to avoid
infecting their unborn babies, increasing numbers of
children in late stages of HIV infection receive
antiretroviral treatment (ART), and a higher
proportion of affected children enjoy some form of
social protection and schooling. However, while all
this is good news, countries still fail to provide basic
services to the majority of orphans and vulnerable
children (OVC) in the context of AIDS. Clearly, all
stakeholders need to do more to protect children
from the effects of AIDS. But how can this be done?
A dominant discourse suggests that governance and
politics can provide leverage to a more effective
response.
Advice from global agencies on how countries
should respond to AIDS is based on the central
assumption that whatever the level of structural
disadvantage and severity of the epidemic, countries
can fight AIDS (more) effectively if they get the
politics right. There have been repeated calls for
better ‘leadership’. These recommendations have an
institutional dimension that is summarised in the
‘Three Ones’: one HIV/AIDS action framework, one
national AIDS coordinating authority, and one
monitoring and evaluation system (UNAIDS 2004).
However, these institutions and processes should
also be based in and give effect to more normative
politics of democracy; responses should mainstream
human rights, and allow for participation and
accountability (UNAIDS 2006a). While the
institutional blueprint is meant to make governance
more effective, the central motivation for the
normative dimension is to ensure HIV-positive
people of protection against discrimination and
access to policymaking on AIDS. But the hypothesis
that politics can make a difference is relevant also
beyond the specifics of the AIDS response. More
general theories of democracy and governance
suggest that countries that are more democratic and
countries that have better governance will respond
more effectively to societal challenges, also in a
development context (Halperin et al. 2005; Goetz
and Jenkins 2004; Sen 1999; UNDP 2002).
This reasoning leads us to the central question for
this research: are countries with better AIDS
governance, with better governance generally and
with higher quality democracy more effective in
responding to the needs of children affected by
AIDS? Or in a different formulation, are any
elements of governance or democracy determinants
of the effectiveness of such responses? If we can
identify any such political factors we have
contributed to the explanation of why some
countries perform better in their responses to AIDS,
but the results may also hold clues for more effective
advocacy strategies.
Our research is guided by four contributions in the
literature that seek to explain variations in country
responses to AIDS through the same methodology
that we will apply here, statistical analysis of data
from a large number of countries. The research by
Nicoli Nattrass (2006) seeks to explain variations in
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coverage on the basis of data from 77 transitional
and developing countries. She includes two political
variables in a larger set of variables on economic,
structural and regional effects. In terms of the
political variables, her results show that quality of the
electoral process has no impact but that established
democracies have better coverage. Mary Kinney’s
research (2007) tests the effect of foreign aid on
ART coverage in sub-Saharan Africa. The research
controls for the political variables identified by
Nattrass, but it also includes data on the quality of
governance and levels of democracy. With regard to
politics, the research shows that better governance is
a determinant of higher ART coverage.
The research by Evan Lieberman (2007) tests
whether the coverage of ART across 85 developing
countries is determined in part by countries’ degree
of ethnic fractionalisation, a factor that is assumed to
reflect the degree to which the provision of public
goods is hampered by the politics of
neopatrimonialism. In terms of political factors, he
finds that both ethnic fractionalisation and
government effectiveness determine ART. The
research by Jacob Bor (2007), finally, argues an
explanation for the quality of governments’
responses to AIDS, as measured by the ‘political
support’ score in the AIDS Program Effort Index with
data on 53 developing countries (POLICY Project
2003). In terms of political factors, he concludes that
electoral accountability has a statistically significant
negative effect on the quality of the response,
suggesting that competitive democratic elections are
a disincentive for a strong government action.
Instead of elections, he finds that the level of press
freedom has a positive effect.
These four different analyses reach somewhat
different results because they use different data to
capture abstract political concepts and because they
include different countries in their analyses. Despite
these differences, it is clear that political variables are
relevant and sometimes central to the explanatory
argument. Compared to the four analyses above, our
research here is more explorative. Instead of
generating a ‘best model’ explanation for a particular
outcome – a model that may or may not include a
political variable – we will test the relevance of a
number of political variables for explaining a number
of different policy outcomes, as will become clear in
the section below. Our research is based on data
from 42 of the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa
(excluding only Liberia and Equatorial Guinea), the
sub-continent which is worst affected by the global
AIDS pandemic and where the needs of children
affected by AIDS present governments with
particular challenges.
2 The data set
As we will introduce and discuss more technical
aspects of our research in the next two sections we
need to say a few words on our chosen style of
presentation. This article is aimed at as broad a
readership as possible. Our prime purpose is to
communicate our rationale for asking the questions,
our methodology for finding answers (in broad
terms), and the substance and implications of our
findings. We will therefore keep the statistical
information at a minimum so as not to lose readers
who are unfamiliar with statistical notations and
discussions. An expanded version of the article which
includes all the required statistical details of our
analysis is available online.1
2.1 Policy outcomes
Three of our variables on policy outcomes are both
AIDS-related and child-specific: the coverage of ART
for children, the coverage of ART for the prevention
of mother-to-child-transmission (PMTCT), and the
ratio of school enrolment between double orphans
and non-orphans (UNAIDS 2007). To these, we add
the ‘policy score’ that countries achieved in the OVC
Index (Monasch et al. 2007, see further below) even
though it captures the quality of policy processes and
content rather than its outcome.
The variables above are our prime focus. However, in
order to interpret them correctly we need to
compare them with policy outcomes that are not
related to AIDS and not directed at children. One
such outcome is the coverage of ART for all in need
of antiretrovirals (ARVs) (UNAIDS 2006b). This
comparison will indicate whether other political
dynamics are at play when the beneficiaries of the
policy are more numerous and eligible to vote. We
also have data on four policy outcomes that are not
directly linked to AIDS: the percentage of people
who have access to water, and to sanitation; the
percentage of children who go to school; and finally
the coverage of measles immunisation for one-year-
old children (UNDP 2006). This comparison will tell
us if AIDS-related policy issues have a particular
political logic, perhaps due to the stigma attached to
AIDS.
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2.2 Political variables
The ten political variables we will be working with
can be grouped into five sets: general governance,
democracy, press freedom, political competitiveness
and AIDS governance. By general governance we
mean the quality of institutions and effectiveness of
the political, bureaucratic and judicial processes of
the state. On the basis of data from the World Bank,
we created an index out of four aspects of
governance that are strongly associated (Kauffman et
al. 2004). We use three variables to capture different
aspects of the quality and strength of democracy.
Also from the World Bank, the variable ‘voice and
accountability’ captures the electoral dimension of
democracy. In order to capture the extent to which
rights and freedoms are respected we created a
‘combined freedom score’ on the basis of data from
Freedom House on civil and political rights.2 The
third alternative measurement of democracy is
generated by the Polity Project.3 The degree of press
freedom is reported by Freedom House, and the
level of competitiveness in the political system is
measured by the parliamentary strength of the
largest opposition party (Lindberg 2006).
Our final set of political variables are all elements of
‘AIDS governance’, a notion that refers to the
different institutions and processes that countries
have adopted for the specific purpose of responding
effectively to HIV/AIDS (Strand 2007). We have two
sets of data on this form of governance, the AIDS
Program Effort Index (POLICY Project 2003) and the
OVC Policy and Planning Effort Index from 2004
(Monasch et al. 2007). We will refer to them as the
‘API’ and the ‘OVC Index’, respectively. Both are
based on surveys filled out by key informants and
stakeholders working in the field of HIV/AIDS in the
different countries. The two surveys identify a
number of elements to the country responses, each
of which are assessed qualitatively and given a score
– the API has ten such elements and the OVC Index
has eight. The mean of those scores is referred to as
the ‘total score’ for each country. Each survey only
covers a subset of the 42 countries in our dataset.
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Table 1 Correlating political and policy outcome variables
Explanatory variables Dependent variables
OVC ART PMTCT ART Water Sanitation School Immunisation
(log) (log) (log) (log) (log) (log)
AIDS governance
API total score 0.430* 0.224 0.430**
API care and 0.502*** 0.290 0.558***
treatment services
OVC Index total score 0.180 0.467* 0.186
OVC Index national 0.369* 0.408** 0.121
action plans
General governance
Governance index 0.540*** 0.371** 0.505*** 0.398*** 0.264** 0.607** 0.424***
Democracy
Combined freedom 0.323* 0.106 0.272* 0.282* 0.298* 0.415** 0.376**
score
Voice and 0.395** 0.298* 0.337** 0.391** 0.351** 0.536*** 0.387**
accountability
Press freedom
Press freedom score 0.307 0.110 0.300 0.251 0.286 0.426** 0.380*
Correlation coefficients (Pearson r) between dependent and explanatory variables. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
API: AIDS Program Effort Index (POLICY Project 2003); OVC Index: OVC Policy and Planning Effort Index from
2004 (Monasch et al. 2007).
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Further, since data on one or more dependent
variables is missing for some countries, our analysis of
the API includes 27–9 countries and the OVC Index
includes 34–6 countries, depending on which variable
is analysed.
As all of these political variables are based on a
combination of fact and judgement – much like
politics itself – their validity should be assessed
carefully. The more general variables are commonly
used for research purposes and are broadly accepted
as the best available measures of the complex
notions they try to capture. The data from the API
and the OVC Index are potentially more problematic
as the process of deciding on the scores was
vulnerable to bias of a nature and degree that is not
reported.
3 Identifying association (correlation) and
causation
In the initial set of analyses we establish which
political variables are linked statistically to one or
more of the outcome variables. While many variables
are correlated as would have been expected, some
are not. The competitiveness of the political system
and the Polity Project measure of democracy have
no statistically significant correlations to any of the
outcome variables, and no political variables are
linked to the schooling ratio between orphans and
non-orphans or to the OVC Index ‘policy score’.
These variables will therefore be excluded from
further analysis. Of the AIDS governance variables,
we report the ‘total score’ and the individual variable
with the strongest link to one or more of the three
AIDS-related dependent variables (Table 1).
Two results are worth highlighting at this stage. All
associations are positive, which means that higher
scores on the political variables are linked to better
coverage and supply of policy outcomes, albeit many
links are weak and some are not statistically significant.
Second, several of the AIDS governance variables that
would have been expected to be linked to better
policy outcomes, given the weight granted to them in
policy advocacy, had no such effect. Most notably, the
API variables ‘political support’ and ‘human rights’ had
no statistically significant link to policy outcomes. We
shall return to those two API variables further below.
The second step in the analysis is to test whether any
of these correlations qualify as causal links between
the political and policy outcome variables. This is
done through a set of regression analyses that
include a number of control variables. These control
variables are, potentially, alternative explanations for
the links between political and outcome variables.
They are included to ensure that they are not the
actual cause of the causal effect on the policy
outcome variable that we otherwise, mistakenly,
would have attributed to political variables. The two
control variables that will be used in all regressions
are GDP per capita in 2003, and ‘ethnic
fractionalisation’. The first variable captures what
financial resources were available to government and
it is also generally accepted as a proxy for overall
state capacity. The second variable is included to
Table 2 Causal effect of political factors on policy outcomes
Explanatory variables Dependent variables
OVC ART (log) ART (log) School Immunisation (log)
AIDS governance
API total score 0.344** (0.007) 0.316 (0.007)
API care and treatment 0.308** (0.005) 0.489** (0.004)
General governance
Governance index 0.313* (0.112) 0.324* (0.094) 0.439** (2.692) 0.411** (0.027)
Democracy
Combined freedom score 0.209 (0.030) 0.176 (0.025) 0.262* (0.725) 0.334** (0.007)
Voice and accountability 0.155 (0.141) 0.178 (0.114) 0.311* (3.308) 0.322* (0.033)
Standardised regression coefficients (ß) with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
API: AIDS Program Effort Index (POLICY Project 2003).
control for Lieberman’s results, using the variable
‘PREG’ created by Dan Posner (2004). In the
regressions on the AIDS-related policy outcomes we
also control for the severity of the epidemic with
data on HIV prevalence in 2005, and the level of
foreign aid that was earmarked for AIDS that
countries received in 2003–4 (Kinney 2007). In
analyses of non-AIDS-related policy outcomes we
use the total overseas development aid per capita (in
2003) to control for external funding. For technical
reasons, the regression analyses included only one
political variable at a time. The two exceptions to this
will be noted below.
The results of the regression analyses are
summarised in Table 2. In order to simplify the
presentation, we have included only the combination
of political and policy outcome variables where one
or more causal links were statistically significant. A
number of variables fall away from the analysis as the
correlation we identified above were not sufficiently
strong to survive the regression analysis. We note in
particular that no political variables could contribute
to the explanation of the variation in the coverage of
PMTCT. This is probably mainly because Namibia and
South Africa – countries with relatively high scores
on governance and democracy – had under achieved,
whereas Swaziland, a country with poor scores on
both governance and democracy, had reached the
second highest level of coverage.
Starting with the AIDS governance variables, it was
to be expected that the API variable ‘care and
treatment’ has a causal effect on both outcome
variables since it measures countries’ coverage of a
range of treatments and support services for AIDS.
This tautology invalidates any actual explanatory
power of this variable, but we shall nevertheless
return to it further below. The API ‘total score’ has
some causal effect on ‘OVC ART’, a finding which
supports the argument that the effective adoption
of the prevailing policy recommendations leads to a
better response in terms of actual outcomes.
Of all the political variables it is the governance index
that is most effective with a causal effect on all four
of the remaining outcome variables. In the two
regressions on the AIDS-related variables,
governance is the only significant variable, both
models explaining about a third of the variation
(adjusted R2). We can conclude that the comparison
between AIDS-related outcomes benefiting children
and those aimed at adults showed no real
differences. Both of them are explained to some
extent by governance, but neither of them is
affected by democracy, either in terms of freedom
or electoral accountability. It is instead the
comparison between outcomes that are AIDS-
related and those that are not that have produced
some interesting results. Although the causal effect
is not very strong, it is clear that the levels of school
enrolment as well as the coverage of measles
immunisation are both determined to some extent
by governance, but also by the quality of democracy,
both in terms of its electoral dimension and the
existence and respect for civil and political freedoms.4
These are the only two outcome variables that are
affected by the democratic variables. This result is
particularly interesting since these policies are
directed towards children, but unlike AIDS, the
needs that motivate them are not stigmatised. The
demand for both these outcomes would be the
same across all countries included in our analysis.
Children need schooling and immunisation equally as
much in Botswana, Angola and Tanzania. And, we
can assume, their parents want both for their
children equally badly in all countries. And yet,
countries deliver unevenly. The larger part of this
variation4 is explained by the level of domestically
generated wealth per capita in relation to schooling,
and the level of foreign aid in relation to
immunisation. But we also learn that more children
go to school and receive immunisation in countries
where their parents’ votes make more of a
difference and where they can claim their political
rights and freedoms. We will comment further on
this finding in the concluding section.
3.1 A plausible causal pathway
The last exploratory step of the statistical analysis will
add some complexity by testing whether we can
trace some additional indirect effect from political
variables on AIDS policy outcomes. The only subset of
our dataset that allows for this analysis is the 29
countries that are included in the API survey. The two
relevant API variables measure the degree to which
the response has ‘political support’ from the highest
level and the degree to which human rights are
mainstreamed into the response. We learnt above
that neither had a direct link to any of the outcome
variables. But could it be that strong political support
and a response that really respects human rights
affect outcomes more indirectly through another
variable? And if this is the case, are there any
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indications that the level of political support and the
quality of human rights mainstreaming depend, in
turn, on political factors that could be leveraged for a
stronger overall response?
Our way of exploring these complexities is through a
set of regression analyses, using the same control
variables as above with the addition of the general
governance index. We shall try to trace any such
effects ‘backwards’ in the causal pathway, starting
with an explanation of why some countries have
better quality care and treatment programmes
(Figure 1). We find that this can in parts be explained
by the quality of countries’ monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) of the AIDS response. This would make sense,
as it is only through effective M&E that any problems
with the care and treatment programmes can be
identified, analysed and rectified continuously. But
this begs the question why some countries have more
effective M&E, and this is where the two political
variables enter the picture. In a regression that
included both ‘political support’ and ‘human rights’,
both variables proved to have a causal effect on the
quality of M&E. Our suggested interpretations for
how those causal effects should be understood are
similar for the two variables. Higher scores on the
political variables imply that political leaders and other
key stakeholders have invested considerable human
and financial resources, as well as political capital, in
order to improve the leadership and human rights
qualities of the response. However, a politician will
only be rewarded politically in the media or in the
next electoral campaign for making such investments
if it can be shown that they have had a positive effect.
And such evidence can only be generated through
effective M&E. The same logic applies to the human
rights qualities of the response. Political leadership
and other country stakeholders who invest resources
in ensuring that human rights are respected in the
response will want to monitor that their
commitment to human rights actually determine the
overall implementation of the response.
It is interesting to note that strong political support
also has a causal effect on the quality of the human
rights mainstreaming of the response. This would
suggest that strong political leadership generates two
concrete effects: effective human rights
mainstreaming and strong M&E. In terms of
identifying the first causal factor in our pathway, the
critical question then becomes what political factors
can explain why leaders in some countries show
stronger support for the AIDS response. Of all the
political variables we have worked with in this analysis,
it is only the governance index that has a causal effect
on ‘political support’. None of the control variables
had any significant effect. The level of political support
shown by leaders does not depend on levels of
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Figure 1 Modelling a plausible causal pathway
Standardised regression coefficients: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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domestic finances or foreign aid for AIDS, it does not
depend on ethnic fractionalisation or even on the
severity of the epidemic. The determinant of strong
political support is the quality of governance in the
state more generally. Good governance has a direct
effect on policy outcomes, but it further improves the
response by generating strong political support, which
in turn strengthens the response through more
programmatic interventions.
4 Conclusions
Our analyses have generated four main results. The
first is the strong suggestion in the data that good
governance more generally in the state is the most
important political determinant of effective policy
outcomes. Effective responses to AIDS across the
sub-Sahara African countries are not caused by
political mobilisation, the available financial resources
or by the scale of the epidemic. Instead, countries
achieve better coverage of ART because they are less
corrupt, because their governments and public
administrations are more effective, because financial
transactions are better regulated and because the
polity has more respect for the rule of law. In order
to improve treatment coverage these countries may
not need more money as much as they need better
bureaucrats. The second result suggests that the
quality of governance in the AIDS response itself has
an effect on policy outcomes. The API data suggest
that a successfully adapted international blueprint
will help generate better policy outcomes. However,
our explorative pathway analysis showed that
effective AIDS governance is at least in part an
effect of good governance more generally. This
finding reinforces the suggestion that good
governance is the fundamental explanation for
successful policy outcomes.
The third finding is more problematic for advocacy.
The fact that none of the political variables that
capture democratic elements of political rights,
electoral accountability or political competitiveness
even correlate with AIDS policy outcomes would
seem to undermine the opportunity for effective
advocacy in the political arena. If any of these
variables would have had a causal effect on
outcomes, such a link would immediately have
suggested strategic opportunities for advocacy. And
yet, policy advocates have no other arena in which to
act. Although these statistics suggest it would make
a difference, AIDS activism would probably soon lose
momentum if the rallying call was ‘more ARVs, less
corruption!’ The fourth main finding may, however,
suggest an alternative strategy.
The fact that both governance and democracy had a
causal effect on the child-specific but non-
stigmatised policies of schooling and immunisation
may hold clues for advocacy for better policy
responses to the needs of children affected by AIDS.
While access to water and sanitation are insensitive
to qualitative aspects of the political regime, the
level of coverage of the child-specific policies are
better in countries where the children’s parents are
part of a more empowered and politically effective
constituency. However, in order for the need for
such services from the state to become a political
incentive for government action, individual needs
must be mobilised and aggregated into demands
from a constituency. But this mobilisation is of
course much more difficult when the need is as
stigmatised as AIDS.
The statistical results and our reasoning around
incentives for political mobilisation and government
action suggest that interventions aimed at benefiting
children affected by HIV/AIDS should be part of a set
of welfare policies that are AIDS sensitive in character
but universal in application. Only with such a political
framing of the issues can demands be freed of stigma
and the supply become part of a political contract
that governments default from only at great political
cost. Only then will politics in Africa really work for
the benefit of children affected by AIDS.
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Notes
* We wish to thank colleagues in the the Joint
Learning Initiative on Children and HIV/AIDS
(JLICA) network, and especially Alex de Waal, for
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Comments are welcome to Per.Strand@uct.ac.za
1 The expanded version of the article will be
available as a CSSR Working Paper and can be
downloaded from the CSSR website at:
www.commerce.uct.ac.za/Research_Units/CSSR/
pubs_cssr_display.asp, or it can be requested from
Per Strand.
2 See www.freedomhouse.org
3 See www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
4 The three regressions on ‘school’ explained some
32–8 per cent of the variation (adjusted R2), with
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GPD per capita being the strongest variable. In the
three regressions on ‘immunisation’, explaining
some 29–32 per cent of the variation, the variable
on foreign aid (‘total ODA’), was the strongest
predictor. The political variables were the only
other significant variables in each regression.
